Are State Elections Affected by the National Economy? Evidence from Australia by Andrew Leigh & Mark McLeish
   
 
The Australian National University 






Are State Elections Affected by the National 

























ISBN: 978 1 921262 71 5 
* Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University.  
Email: andrew.leigh@anu.edu.au; http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/~aleigh/ 
† mark.mcleish@alumni.unimelb.edu.au 
 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Renée Adams, Sambit Bhattacharyya, Chris Skeels, Jeff Williamson, 
Justin Wolfers, seminar participants at the University of Queensland Business School, two anonymous referees, 
and the associate editor (Glenn Otto) for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. In addition, Tim Hatton 
supplied data on UK unemployment, and Don Harding shared data on Australian business cycles. Susanne 
Schmidt provided outstanding research assistance. All data used in this paper, as well as a full dataset of state 





Using data from 191 Australian state elections, we test how voters respond to 
economic conditions. We find that unemployment has a strong impact on election 
outcomes, with each additional percentage point of unemployment reducing the 
incumbent’s re-election probability by 3-5 per cent. However, when we separate luck 
(unemployment in other states) from competence (unemployment in that state relative 
to the rest of Australia), we find that both luck and competence are equally important. 
This is consistent with a psychological theory of the ‘fundamental attribution error’, in 
which observers consistently underestimate the importance of situational constraints. 
We also find evidence that unemployment driven by a clearly exogenous source – the 
United States economy – has a non-trivial impact on the re-election probability of 
Australian state governments. Our results suggest that Australian voters either retain 
too many state governments in economic booms, vote out too many state governments 
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In the early-1990s, the Australian economy entered its deepest downturn in the post-
war era, with the national unemployment rate reaching nearly 12 percent in early-
1993. During the period 1992-1995, six of Australia’s eight states and territories 
ousted their government.
1 By contrast, the mid-2000s saw the Australian economy 
enjoying strong growth and falling unemployment. During 2003-2006, Australia’s 
unemployment rate averaged 5 percent. In these years, no state or territory 
government was ousted from power. Were the state leaders who lost office in the 
early-1990s unfairly punished for the state of the national economy? And were 
some of those who kept office in the mid-2000s unfairly rewarded?  
 
In a number of studies, psychologists have noted the tendency of observers to 
overestimate the control that actors have over their environment, and underplay the 
importance of situational constraints. This bias, known variously as ‘fundamental 
attribution error’ or ‘the overattribution effect’, has been the focus of a wide variety 
of laboratory experiments.
2 Economists have also demonstrated the existence of 
fundamental attribution error in various settings. For example, CEO compensation 
is just as responsive to a ‘lucky dollar’ as to an ‘earned dollar’ (Bertrand & 
                                                 
1 Changes of government occurred in the Australian Capital Territory (1995), New 
South Wales (1995), South Australia (1993), Tasmania (1992), Victoria (1992), and 
Western Australia (1993). The exceptions were Queensland and the Northern 
Territory. 
2 See for example Ross (1977), Tetlock (1985), Ross and Nisbett (1991), Jones 
(1990), and Gilbert and Malone (1995). In the classic laboratory experiment, 
subjects were asked to discern the true beliefs of essay-writers from a set of essays. 
Although they were told that the essay-writers had been instructed to take a 
particular position in the essay, they nonetheless tended to conclude that the writer 
supported that position.  2 
Mullainathan, 2001). Managers do not adjust for employee task difficulty when 
assessing employee ability (Durrell, 2001). On the sporting field, and even in 
financial markets, participants often believe in the ‘hot hand’ fallacy: the notion that 
individuals have runs of success or failure that are determined by more than chance 
(McFadden, 2006).  
 
In this paper, we explore fundamental attribution error in a different context, 
looking at whether voters in Australian state and territory elections parse out the 
effects of the national economy when deciding whether to re-elect their 
governments. Our theory is a simple one: if voters are fully rational, and their voting 
decisions are based on economic conditions, they should not merely take into 
account the performance of their own state economy. Instead, they should compare 
their state’s economic performance to that of other states in the nation. (From this 
point on, we refer to the states and territories just as ‘states’, for simplicity.)  
 
In broad terms, our paper relates to the extensive literature that has looked at the 
impact of the macroeconomy on election outcomes (e.g. Kramer, 1971; Fair, 1978; 
Chappell, 1983; Kenny, 1983; Peltzman, 1987; Alesina et al., 1993; Alesina et al., 
1999). This literature includes several studies that have analysed Australian federal 
election outcomes (Jackman & Marks, 1994; Jackman 1995; Cameron & Crosby, 
2000; Wolfers & Leigh, 2002). In general, these studies have found that the 
economy affects election outcomes; however there is evidence to suggest that when 
the same models are estimated for both the United States and Australia, Australian 
voters appear to be less sensitive to the macroeconomy (Leigh & Wolfers, 2006). 
 3 
The two closest studies to our own are Wolfers (2007), who found that state 
governors are more likely to be re-elected when the national economy booms, and 
Leigh (2009), who concluded that voters in national elections are more likely to re-
elect national leaders when the world economy is growing rapidly.
3 Our analysis 
builds on these studies by using state-level data from Australia, a country for which 
the effect of the macroeconomy on state elections has not previously been 
analysed.
4 By exploiting very rich data on unemployment, we are able to test for 
attribution errors over an exceptionally long period, from 1913 to 2006.  
 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines our data and 
methodology. Section III presents results, and the final section concludes.  
 
II. Data and Methodology 
 
The creation of the dataset used in our analysis entailed substantial archival 
research. Election outcomes were hand-coded from the Australian Government and 
Politics Database at the University of Western Australia (2006). While information 
on the primary vote share is available for Australian state elections, we were not 
able to obtain consistently-coded data on vote share after the allocation of 
preferences. Consequently, instead of using vote-share data, our dependent variable 
                                                 
3 See also Ebeid and Rodden (2006), who test the theory on a smaller number of 
years than Wolfers, and conclude that the relative performance of the state economy 
matters more for voters in non-agricultural states. 
4 In comparing the ability of state and federal governments to affect the 
macroeconomy in Australia and the United States, an important similarity is that the 
two countries’ constitutions have a similar allocation of powers between the federal 
government and the state governments. However, a key difference is that in the 
United States, the executive is separately elected (raising the possibility of deadlock 
between the lower house and the executive), while in Australia, the executive is 
drawn from the legislature. 4 
is a ‘change of government’ indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the incumbent 
party loses, and 0 if the incumbent party wins.  
 
The election outcomes data set covers the period 1913-2006. Although state election 
data is available for years before 1913, we are constrained by the availability of 
state economic data prior to this point. Australia’s two territories only began holding 
elections late in the sample period (the ACT in 1989 and the NT in 1974). Because 
our dependent variable is a change of government, and one of our key independent 
variables is the change in the macroeconomy over the election cycle, we drop the 
first election for each state from our sample.
5 Across the state elections in our 
sample, the Labor Party were the incumbent 51 per cent of the time, and the 
conservative parties were the incumbent 49 per cent of the time. (At the federal 
level, by contrast, the Labor Party were the incumbent for 45 per cent of the 
elections in our sample, while conservatives parties held federal office when 55 per 
cent of our elections took place.) 
 
Our chosen measure of economic performance is the unemployment rate. We opt to 
use unemployment on the basis that it follows the existing literature (unemployment 
is an oft-used economic indicator in political business cycle studies), and for reasons 
of convenience (high-frequency state-based unemployment data are available over a 
much longer time span than other economic indicators). As is well known, 
economic indicators often move in tandem. For example, over the period for which 
                                                 
5 Specifically, we drop the following elections: ACT 1989, NSW 1913, QLD 1915, 
SA 1915, TAS 1913, VIC 1914, WA 1914. For the Northern Territory, we drop 
both the 1974 and 1977 elections, since we do not have unemployment data for the 
Northern Territory in 1974. The first election for each state is ACT 1992, NSW 
1917, NT 1980, QLD 1918, SA 1918, TAS 1916, VIC 1917, WA 1917. 5 
we are able to obtain estimates of state unemployment and gross state product per 
capita (1990-2006), the R
2 from a regression of unemployment on GSP is 0.63. 
(This is not merely due to cross-state differences. When we include state fixed 
effects, the within-state R
2 is 0.52.)  
 
Since there is no single source for state unemployment rates, we merge data from 
four sources. These are:  
a)  the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1978-2006);  
b)  the DX database (1971-1977);  
c)  estimates from the Australian Department of Labour and National Service 
on the number of people registered to receive unemployment benefits (1947-
1970), combined with estimates of the state labour force from the census; 
and 
d)  trade union unemployment rates from the Labour report (covering the period 
1913-1946). 
Details of our sources and adjustments are described in the data appendix. So far as 
we are aware, we are the first to estimate state unemployment rates covering the 
period 1913-2006. 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our key dependent and independent variables 
by state. Panel A shows results for all 191 elections in our sample. Panel B shows 
the results for the 64 elections that resulted in a change of government, and Panel C 
shows the results for the 127 elections that did not result in a change of government.  
 
This table suggests that the state of the economy matters:  in the elections that 
resulted in a change of government, the mean state unemployment rate was 6.6%, 6 
and the state unemployment rate rose by an average of 1.3%; while in the elections 
that did not result in a change of government, the mean state unemployment rate 
was 4.8%, and the state unemployment rate fell by an average of 0.6%. A similar 
pattern emerges using data from the rest of Australia: in the elections that resulted in 
a change of government, the mean rest of Australia unemployment rate was 6.4%, 
and the unemployment rate in the rest of Australia rose by an average of 1.1%; 
while in the elections that did not result in a change of government, the mean rest of 
Australia unemployment rate was 5.0%, and the unemployment rate in the rest of 
Australia fell by an average of 0.6%.  7 
 
Table 1: Change in government and unemployment by state 
   Own  state  Rest of Australia 
  Elections U  ΔU U ΔU 
Panel A: All Elections 
ACT 5 5.7% 0.0% 7.6%  0.0%
NSW 30 5.6% 0.0% 5.2%  0.0%
NT 8 6.5% 0.2% 7.4%  -0.1%
QLD 32 5.0% -0.2% 5.4%  0.0%
SA 29 5.2% 0.0% 5.0%  -0.1%
TAS 28 6.0% 0.1% 5.5%  0.0%
VIC 31 5.0% 0.1% 5.4%  0.1%
WA 28 5.1% 0.1% 5.5%  0.0%
Total 191 5.4% 0.0% 5.5%  0.0%
Panel B: Change in Government 
ACT 2 5.5% -1.4% 7.3%  -1.7%
NSW 12 6.9% 1.2% 6.2%  0.6%
NT 1 7.0% 1.5% 6.6%  -1.5%
QLD 5 6.5% 1.0% 8.5%  2.7%
SA 12 6.8% 1.5% 6.1%  1.0%
TAS 10 7.7% 0.8% 6.5%  0.3%
VIC 10 5.7% 1.8% 5.8%  1.5%
WA 12 5.9% 1.6% 6.3%  2.1%
Total 64 6.6% 1.3% 6.4%  1.1%
Panel C: No Change in Government 
ACT 3 5.9% 0.8% 7.7%  1.0%
NSW 18 4.8% -0.7% 4.5%  -0.4%
NT 7 6.4% 0.0% 7.5%  0.1%
QLD 27 4.7% -0.4% 4.8%  -0.5%
SA 17 4.1% -1.0% 4.2%  -0.8%
TAS 18 5.1% -0.3% 4.9%  -0.2%
VIC 21 4.6% -0.8% 5.1%  -0.6%
WA 16 4.5% -1.1% 4.9%  -1.5%
Total 127 4.8% -0.6% 5.0%  -0.6%
Note: ΔU is the change in the unemployment rate since the previous election in that state or territory. 





We begin by providing a graphical flavour of our results; charting the Australian 
national unemployment rate against the share of state governments who lost an 
election (averaged over 5 year periods). Given that each state makes up only a 
minority of the national economy, it should be the case that if voters assess their 8 
state government’s economic performance by reference to the rest of Australia, the 
relationship between national economic circumstances and state election outcomes 
will be weak or non-existent.
6 Instead, the relationship appears to be quite strong 
and positive. As Figure 1 shows, at times when unemployment is high, the share of 
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To make the point clearer still, Figure 2 plots the relationship between the 
unemployment rate in the United States and the share of Australian state 
governments that are re-elected. Since the United States economy has a strong effect 
on the Australian economy (but not vice-versa), this provides further evidence that 
                                                 
6 To see why this relationship might be weak (rather than non-existent), suppose 
that an upswing in unemployment is primarily driven by a large state (e.g. NSW or 
Victoria). Such an upswing would increase the national unemployment rate, and 
voters in that state who benchmarked their economy against other states would 
nonetheless be more inclined to vote out their government. We address this in our 
regression analysis by including separate controls for the unemployment rate in a 
given state and the unemployment rate in the rest of Australia. 9 
Australian voters do not parse out general economic conditions when choosing 
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Fig 2: Australian state elections and US unemployment
 
 
In our regression analysis, we begin by simply looking at the effect of economic 
conditions on state elections. In these regressions, the dependent variable is whether 
the government was re-elected, and the key independent variable is the level of 
unemployment, or the change in unemployment over the electoral cycle.
7  
 
We also need to account for variables that might affect a government’s probability 
of re-election, and which may also be correlated with economic circumstances. We 
therefore include three indicator variables. The first is an indicator to account for a 
honeymoon effect, which is equal to 1 if it is the incumbent government’s first 
                                                 
7 During the post-war period, it is possible to obtain data on the inflation rate in the 
capital city of each state and territory. However, when we include both inflation and 
unemployment (or change in inflation and change in unemployment), the inflation 
coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant. 10 
election after coming into power, and 0 otherwise.
8 The second indicator variable 
accounts for the possibility that Labor and conservative governments might have a 
differential probability of being re-elected, and is equal to 1 when the incumbent 
government is Labor, and 0 otherwise.
9 The third indicator variable accounts for the 
possibility that voters might use state elections to send a message to the federal 
government. Consequently, state governments might find it more difficult to win re-
election if the same party is in power federally. This ‘message’ variable is equal to 1 
when the incumbent state government is of the same party as the federal 
government, and 0 otherwise.
10 To account for the possibility that re-election rates 
differ systematically by state, we also include state fixed effects.  
 
Our first two regression specifications take the form:  
st s st st st Z U rnment ChangeGove ε δ γ β α + + + + = '      
 (1) 
st s st st st Z U rnment ChangeGove ε δ γ β α + + + Δ + = '    
 (2) 
                                                 
8 We include a honeymoon dummy on the basis that it accords with the previous 
literature. Other specifications, such as a quadratic term for the number of years 
since the party took office, have virtually no effect on the unemployment 
coefficients. 
9 We also experimented with interacting unemployment (or the change in 
unemployment) with the ALP indicator – effectively testing the hypothesis that the 
impact of unemployment on re-election differs according to the political 
complexion of the incumbent. In each case, the interaction coefficient was quite 
small and statistically insignificant. 
10 Conversely, it might be the case that state incumbents are more likely to be re-
elected if they are of the same party as the federal government. This could occur if 
voters held general beliefs about the competence of particular political parties 
during certain eras (e.g. that the conservative Coalition were more competent in the 
late-1950s, or that the Labor Party was more competent during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century). Empirically, there appears to be some support for this: the 
‘message’ indicator variable is negative in all specifications. 11 
 
where ChangeGovernment is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the state government 
in state s in election t loses office, and 0 if it is returned. Ust is the unemployment 
rate in state s and year t, and ΔUst is the state-specific change in the unemployment 
rate over the election cycle. Z is a vector of control variables, δ are state fixed 
effects, and ε is an error term. The parameter β denotes the effect of economic 




Table 2 shows the results of these regressions. Focusing on the level of 
unemployment (column 1), we show that if the unemployment rate is 1 percent 
higher, then the probability of a state government losing office increases by 2.8 
percentage points, while a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the 
election cycle increases the probability of a state government losing office by 3.7 
percentage points (column 2). Since the average probability of a change in 
government is 33 percent, this suggests that unemployment can have a substantial 
impact on election outcomes. 
 
                                                 
11 We do not use a probit model since “the probit model does not lend itself to a 
fixed effects treatment” (Baltagi, 2001: 209). Results from a logit model are similar, 
though the sample is smaller when business cycle fixed effects are included, since 
the dependent variable does not always vary within a business cycle. Using a linear 
probability model also simplifies our IV analysis in Table 4, since logit IV estimates 
are unreliable (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). Wooldridge (2002) suggests that a check 
on the linear probability model is to see how many of the fitted values do not lie 
between 0 and 1. For the linear probability models estimated without business cycle 
fixed effects, between 2 and 5 of the 191 observations lie outside the 0/1 interval. 
For each of the linear probability models estimated with business cycle fixed 
effects, between 10 and 11 of the 191 observations lie outside the 0/1 interval. 12 
In columns 3 and 4, we include business cycle fixed effects, with business cycles 
coded from Harding (2002). By allowing each business cycle to take its own fixed 
effect, we reduce the likelihood that the results are driven by a single period, such as 
the harsh downturns of the 1930s and 1990s, or the long boom of the 1950s and 
1960s.
12 The results from this specification are slightly larger than those without 
business cycle fixed effects: if the unemployment rate is 1 percent higher, then the 
probability of a state government losing office increases by 4.9 percentage points, 
while a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate over the election cycle 




The other controls generally take the expected sign. As at the federal level 
(Cameron & Crosby, 2000), state governments are more likely to be re-elected in 
their first election after coming to power. We estimate that this ‘honeymoon effect’ 
is worth 9-10 percentage points (though this is not statistically significant). The 
Labor coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant in all specifications, 
suggesting that there are no important partisan differences in re-election rates once 
the state of the economy has been taken into account.  We find no evidence that 
voters use state elections to send ‘a message to Canberra’. Indeed, the coefficient on 
                                                 
12 Another approach is to drop the 1930s entirely from our data. When we do this, 
the coefficients on unemployment, luck and competence tend to be of about the 
same magnitude, but are generally not statistically significant (p-values around 0.1-
0.2). This suggests the possibility that there may be some non-linearity in the 
relationship between unemployment and election outcomes. However, given the 
binary nature of our dependent variable, we do not explore this issue further. 
13 We also re-estimated the models in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, adding the 
unemployment rate in the year of the previous election. When we do this, the 
coefficient on the previous election’s unemployment rate is negative and 
statistically significant, but the coefficient on the current unemployment rate 
remains significant, and the point estimate is slightly higher (4.567 for the 
specification in column 1 and 5.001 for the specification in column 3). 13 
the Message dummy is negative, indicating that state governments are less likely to 
be ousted if the federal government is of the same political party. 
 
 
Table 2: Does the state economy affect election outcomes? 
Dependent variable is 1 if the incumbent government loses office, 0 otherwise 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
U  2.845***  4.895***  
  [0.816]  [1.197]  
ΔU   3.674***  4.108*** 
   [0.796]  [0.716] 
Honeymoon  -0.092 -0.095 -0.105 -0.088 
  [0.075] [0.073] [0.077] [0.076] 
ALP  -0.017 0.002 0.019 0.009 
  [0.076] [0.075] [0.080] [0.078] 
Message  -0.069 -0.025 -0.128 -0.123 
  [0.075] [0.071] [0.080] [0.079] 
State  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Business Cycle FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  191 191 191 191 
R
2  0.11 0.13 0.22 0.24 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables Honeymoon,  ALP, and 
Message are indicators denoting, respectively, honeymoon elections, an ALP incumbent government, 
and the incumbent government being of the same party as the federal government. 
We now turn to consider whether the impact of economic conditions on state 
elections is due to voters rewarding luck or competence. To do this, we define two 
unemployment variables:  
•  the unemployment rate in the rest of Australia (‘luck’), and 
•  the unemployment rate in that state, minus the rate in the rest of Australia 
(‘competence’).  
 14 
We now specify regressions that take the form:  
 
( ) st s st st st st st Z U U U rnment ChangeGove ε δ γ β β α + + + − + + = ' ~ 2 ~ 1   
 (3) 
( ) st s st st st st st Z U U U rnment ChangeGove ε δ γ β β α + + + Δ − Δ + Δ + = ' ~ 2 ~ 1  
 (4) 
 
In equation 3, U~st is the unemployment rate in the rest of Australia (‘luck’) and (Ust 
–U~st) is the difference between a state’s unemployment rate and the rest of 
Australia (‘competence’). Equation 4 is a similar specification, but with 
unemployment specified in changes instead of levels. In both equations, the 
parameters β1 and β2 denote luck and competence respectively.
14 
 
Table 3 shows the results of these specifications. Again, we show four 
specifications, with unemployment defined as levels and differences, and with and 
without business cycle fixed effects. Across these four specifications, we find 
consistent evidence that luck and competence bring similar benefits to state 
governments. For example, controlling for business cycle fixed effects, and 
estimating unemployment in levels (column 3), we find that a 1 percentage point 
rise in unemployment in the rest of Australia increases the probability of a state 
                                                 
14 We specify our regressions in this manner since both β1 and β2 have an intuitive 
interpretation (‘luck’ and ‘competence’ respectively). However, note that one could 
achieve the same result by rearranging the parameters rather than the variables, 
since  () st st st U U U ~ 2 ~ 1 − + β β  is equivalent to( ) st st U U 2 ~ 2 1 β β β + − . We also 
experimented with specifying competence as  st st U U ~ / , and found that the 
coefficients on both luck and competence remained positive and statistically 
significant. 
 15 
government losing office by 5.1 percentage points, while a 1 percentage point rise in 
unemployment in that state – relative to the rest of Australia – increases the 
probability of that government losing office by 4.4 percentage points. All but two of 
the eight luck and competence coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 3: Which matters more – luck or competence? 
Dependent variable is 1 if the incumbent government loses office, 0 otherwise 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Luck (U~st)  2.731***  5.130***  
  [0.877]  [1.533]  
Competence (Ust–U~st)  3.821   4.373**   
  [2.390]  [2.215]  
Luck (ΔU~st)   3.893***  4.210*** 
   [0.828]  [0.749] 
Competence (ΔUst –ΔU~st)   2.723   3.722** 
   [1.813]  [1.692] 
Honeymoon  -0.096 -0.094 -0.103 -0.087 
  [0.075] [0.073] [0.077] [0.076] 
ALP -0.017  0.006  0.02  0.011 
  [0.076] [0.075] [0.080] [0.079] 
Message -0.066  -0.028  -0.13  -0.124 
  [0.075] [0.071] [0.081] [0.079] 
State  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Business Cycle FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  191 191 191 191 
R
2  0.11 0.13 0.22 0.24 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables Honeymoon,  ALP, and 
Message are indicators denoting, respectively, honeymoon elections, an ALP incumbent government, 
and the incumbent government being of the same party as the federal government. In all four 
specifications, an F-test cannot reject (at the 10% level) the hypothesis that the luck and competence 
coefficients are the same.  
 
 
One possible explanation for the results in Table 3 is that they are affected by a 
variant of the classic reflection problem (Manski, 1993). To see this, suppose that 
two neighbouring states, A and B, have a positive effect on each other’s economies. 
Now suppose that the government of state A reduces unemployment. This will have 
the effect of also lowering unemployment in state B. Understanding this, a rational 
voter might well reward the government of state A when she observes a reduction in 16 
employment in both states. If economic spillovers are large, what we term ‘luck’ 
may well also contain a measure of ‘competence’. 
 
A plausible solution to this problem is to find some instrument that affects the 
economy in the rest of Australia, but is uncorrelated with a state government’s 
competence. One suitable instrument is the unemployment rate in the United States. 
As noted above, the United States economy affects the economy of Australia’s 
states, but because the Australian economy is only one-twentieth the size of the US 
economy, the reverse does not hold.
15 For example, around the year 2000, the US 
accounted for 13 percent of Australia’s merchandise trade, while Australia 
accounted for less than 1 percent of the US’s merchandise trade. We can therefore 
instrument ‘luck’ with the US unemployment rate, or the change in the US 
unemployment rate over the election cycle, as applicable. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of these specifications. The coefficients on luck and 
competence remain positive in all specifications, and are generally of similar 
magnitude to the corresponding estimates in Table 2. Five of the eight luck and 
competence coefficients are statistically significant, while three are not. In none of 
the specifications can we reject the null hypothesis that the luck and competence 
coefficients are of the same magnitude. This suggests that to the extent that 
                                                 
15 An alternative approach would be to instrument using the UK unemployment rate, 
which requires splicing together data from Feinstein (1972), Boyer and Hatton 
(2002), and the Office for National Statistics (2008). This produces similar results. 
Our rationale for using the US series as an instrument is that: (a) the first stage is 
slightly stronger – most likely because the UK series is somewhat noisier; and (b) 
the exclusion restriction is a little less likely to hold for the US than the UK, given 
that the UK is a smaller country. Australian trade with the UK and US over the 
twentieth century is plotted in ABS (2001, 1037), which shows that until the 1960s, 
the UK was a larger trading partner for Australia than the US, after which the two 
countries swapped places.  17 
Australian voters respond to the change in economic conditions over the cycle, this 
response is as much driven by luck as by competence. 
 
Table 4: Instrumenting luck with US unemployment 
Dependent variable is 1 if the incumbent government loses office, 0 otherwise 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Luck (U~st)  1.871   4.315**  
  [1.144]  [2.015]  
Competence (Ust–U~st)  3.513   4.171**  
  [2.390]  [2.061]  
Luck (ΔU~st)   3.206***  3.764*** 
   [1.097]  [0.988] 
Competence (ΔUst –ΔU~st)   2.561   3.605** 
   [1.779]  [1.578] 
Honeymoon  -0.1  -0.095 -0.102 -0.087 
  [0.072] [0.071] [0.071] [0.070] 
ALP  -0.017 0.001 0.016 0.008 
  [0.074] [0.073] [0.074] [0.073] 
Message -0.05  -0.025  -0.126*  -0.122* 
  [0.074] [0.069] [0.074] [0.073] 
State  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Business Cycle FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  191 191 191 191 
Centred R
2  0.10 0.12 0.22 0.24 








Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables Honeymoon,  ALP, and 
Message are indicators denoting, respectively, honeymoon elections, an ALP incumbent government, 
and the incumbent government being of the same party as the federal government. In both levels and 
differenced specifications, ‘luck’ is instrumented using the US unemployment rate, or the change in 
the US unemployment rate over the election cycle. In all four specifications, an F-test cannot reject 
(at the 10% level) the hypothesis that the luck and competence coefficients are the same. 
 
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Prior to the 2006 state election in South Australia, then Prime Minister John 
Howard told a radio interviewer:
16 
                                                 
16 Transcript of John Howard interview with Keith Colon and Tony Pilkington on 
5AA Adelaide on 22 February 2006, archived at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/20061221-18 
 
‘one of the things I can do is point out immediately that during this election 
campaign, Mr Rann will undoubtedly say how strong the South Australian 
economy is and claim all of the credit. But most people, when they step back 
and think about it, realise that the strength of the economy is determined by 
national economic policy. It’s been my experience in more than 30 years of 
politics that when the economy is bad, the Federal Government gets the 
blame, which is fair enough because it’s got all the major economic levers, 
and when the economy is good, state premiers fall over themselves to claim 
the credit. But the truth is that it’s national economic policy that has 
delivered low unemployment, low debt and so many other things for South 
Australia. And I would hope that South Australian voters would keep that in 
mind and put aside the more extravagant claims that are going to be made by 
Mr Rann during his campaign.’ 
 
Like all state and territory governments who faced election in the four years from 
2003 to 2006, the South Australian government was returned to office. Whether or 
not Mr Howard was right to claim federal credit for the economic performance of 
the national economy (which may well have been due to the strong performance of 
the world economy), our results show that state voters systematically commit 
attribution errors – giving state leaders too much blame when their economy is in 
recession, and too much credit when it is booming.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview1784.html (accessed 20 March 
2008). 19 
Using data on 191 state elections, we find strong evidence that economic conditions 
(as proxied by the unemployment rate) are positively correlated with whether the 
incumbent government was returned to power. We find that the economy does 
matter in Australian state elections, with each additional percentage point of 
unemployment (or each percentage point increase over the cycle) reducing the 
incumbent government’s re-election probability by 3-5 percentage points.  
 
We also find that what matters most is not the performance of the state economy 
relative to the national economy, but the state economy itself. This is consistent with 
voters committing the ‘fundamental attribution error’: rewarding state governments 
who happen to be in office during national booms, and punishing those who hold 
office during recessions. When we separate the impact of economic circumstances 
into unemployment in the rest of Australia (luck) and unemployment in that state 
relative to the rest of Australia (competence), we find that both are about equally 
important in determining whether incumbents lose office. In most specifications, 
this result is robust to instrumenting luck with the United States unemployment rate. 
 
What are the underlying factors driving the fundamental attribution error? One 
psychological study (Gilbert and Malone 1995) suggests that there are four distinct 
causes of correspondence bias (resulting in fundamental attribution error). These are 
a lack of situational awareness, unrealistic expectations of behaviour, inflated 
categorisations of behaviour, or incomplete corrections of dispositional inferences. 
Our results are consistent with all four of Gilbert and Malone’s underlying causes, 
but seems to particularly support the theory that voters lack situational awareness. 
This lack of situational awareness could arise in part from a lack of knowledge by 20 
voters about the degree to which state governments can affect the macroeconomy. It 
may also be reinforced by politicians who claim credit for being ‘good economic 
managers’. Indeed, some may regard it as fitting that state politicians who claim 
credit for booms (over which they have little control) are subsequently punished by 
the electorate for busts (over which they also have little control). 
 
How do our results compare with those from other studies? In a similar specification 
to our differenced specification, Wolfers (2007) finds that a one percentage point 
increase in national unemployment (‘luck’) is associated with a 1.6 percentage point 
increase in the probability that the incumbent governor loses, while a one 
percentage point increase in state unemployment relative to the national rate 
(‘competence’) is associated with a 3.0 percentage point increase in the probability 
that the incumbent governor loses.
17 Our closest estimate to this is shown in column 
2 of Table 3, where the comparable coefficients on luck and competence are 3.9 and 
2.7, respectively. Although the sample of years in the two studies differs, this 
suggests that Australian voters in state elections are more inclined to reward ‘luck’ 
than their US counterparts. 
 
At the national level, Leigh (2009) finds that an additional percentage point in world 
growth (‘luck’) boosts incumbents’ re-election probability by 7 percentage points, 
more than twice the magnitude of the effect of competence (an additional 
percentage point of national growth relative to world growth raises the probability 
that incumbent governments will be re-elected by 3 percentage points). While voters 
                                                 
17 To be precise, Wolfers (2007) uses the ‘employment gap’ (the deviation of log 
employment from its trend level) rather than unemployment, but he shows that the 
two series track one another very closely at the national level. The estimates cited 
here are from column 4 of Table 2 in his paper. 21 
in Australian state elections do appear to reward luck, they do not reward it twice as 
much as competence, and can therefore be said to be more effective at filtering out 
the national economic cycle than voters in national elections are at filtering out the 
world economic cycle. 
 
The central finding of our paper – that voters are not perfectly rational – is 
consistent with a substantial body of literature in political science and economics. 
For example, Achen and Bartels (2004) observed that governments are less likely to 
be re-elected when elections are accompanied by droughts, floods, or shark attacks. 
Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argue that since the probability of a voter casting the 
decisive ballot is extremely small, we should expect most voting to be expressive 
(i.e. a symbolic act, undertaken for its own sake) rather than instrumental (i.e. aimed 
at bringing about particular outcomes). Given that individuals systematically 
underestimate the impact of situational constraints when the stakes are high (e.g. 
when setting CEO pay or managing employees), it is scarcely surprising that 
electors do the same when there is only a tiny chance that their vote will matter. 22 
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State Unemployment Rates 
 
As outlined in the text, we create state unemployment rates by combining data from 
four sources. These are:  
 
a)  From 1978-2006, the Australian Bureau of Statistics has published estimates 
of the unemployment rate for all Australian states and territories (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2006a). 
 
b)  From 1971-1977, unemployment estimates are available via the DX 
database (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006b).  
 
c)  From 1947-1970, we use estimates from the Australian Department of 
Labour and National Service (1972) on the number of people registered to 
receive unemployment benefits. To calculate an unemployment rate, we 
divide this number by the labour force in each state and territory. These 
estimates are taken from the 1933-1971 censuses, published in 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (1934, 1950, 1962, 1964, 
1969, 1973). (Note that censuses up to 1961 excluded full-blooded 
Aboriginal people.) We interpolate labour force estimates linearly for non-
census years.  
 
d)  From 1913-1946, we obtain trade union unemployment rates from 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (1913-1953, various years). 
In each year, we use estimates for the month of August or the September quarter 
(the only exception being the Northern Territory in 1977, where the only available 
data are for the December quarter). 
 
Prior to 1970, estimates for South Australia include Northern Territory residents, 
and estimates for New South Wales include the Australian Capital Territory. In both 
cases, this is unlikely to have much of an effect on the estimates. Over this period, 
the NT accounted for 1.2-7.5% of the SA+NT labour force, while the ACT 
accounted for 0.4-3.2% of the NSW+ACT labour force. 
 
While sources (a) and (b) are comparable with one another, we need to make 
adjustments to sources (c) and (d). To do this, we take advantage of the Australian 
unemployment series created by Butlin (1977), as published in Maddock and 
McLean (1987: 353-355). For each year from 1913-1970, we calculate the ratio of 
the unemployment rate in Australia in our series (based on benefit recipients or 
trade union unemployment). We then adjust the series for each state by the same 
ratio. This approach allows for the possibility that the datasets diverge from one 
another in different ways from year to year. By construction, our estimates are close 
to those of Butlin (1977).   
 
In order to calculate an unemployment rate for the rest of Australia, we need to 
combine data for other states, weighting those other states by their share of the 
national labour force. For 1913-1970, state labour force estimates are derived from 27 
the censuses. From 1971-2006, state labour force estimates are derived from sources 
(a) and (b) above. The state shares are exclusive of the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory for the period when we do not have separate 
unemployment rates for them. 
 
Appendix Figure 1 plots estimated unemployment rates for each state and the rest of 
Australia. 
 
Australian Unemployment Rate 
 
The Australian national unemployment rate plotted in Figure 1 is from Maddock 
and McLean (1987: 353-355) for 1913-1977, and from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2007) for 1978-2006.  
 
United States Unemployment Rate 
 
The US unemployment rate plotted in Figure 2 and used as an instrumental variable 
in Table 4 is the civilian unemployment series from Weir (1992: 341-343) for 1913-
1947, and US Bureau of Labor Statistics series BLS series ID LNU04000000 for 
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